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I. Introduction
The 80s have been a lost decade for many developing countries. Macroeconomic
mismanagement significantly contributed to this development. To a large extent,
real exchange rate overvaluation and the lack of fiscal and monetary discipline
can be blamed for low growth, high unemployment, and persistent debt
problems (see, e.g., Sachs [1989] and Williamson [1990]. In the same vein,
newly emerging market economies in the formerly socialist countries - after
several lost decades - show the same indicators for monetary instability and
macroeconomic disequilibrium [Nunnenkamp, 1992]: unsustainable fiscal
deficits, excessive money creation, high and volatile inflation rates, and
overvalued exchange rates.
Therefore, maroeconomic policy faces the same challenges in developing and
newly emerging market economies. Inflation and real exchange rate
disequilibrium has to be reduced by an appropriate monetary and exchange rate
policy. Recently, a concept which has been often tried in developing countries
was proposed for newly emerging market economies as well: exchange rate
based stabilization [Bofinger, 1991; Schmieding, 1992; Hofmann, Sell, 1993].
The basic argument is that a nominal anchor in the form of a fixed exchange rate
imports the anti-inflationary reputation of currencies by tying the hands of the
own monetary authorities. If discretionary policy is ruled out and monetary
policy is determined by the foreign central Bank, the credibility of the reform
would improve, private agents would adjust at once, and inflation would
decrease to the level of the stable currency.
Looking at the bleak experience with exchange rate based stabilization in
developing countries [Schweickert et al., 1992], the persistent attractiveness of
the concept is rather surprising. For developing and newly emerging market
economies considering the concept, the relevant question is whether the concept
or an inconsistent implementation is to be blamed for the failures of the concept
in reality. This paper argues that it is rather the concept than the implementation.
A consistent implementation is a necessary precondition to sustain the fixed
exchange rate and to improve performance effects but - even in this case - theconcept contains a high risk because real exchange rate overvaluation is
provoked and real exchange rate devaluation becomes a demanding task.
The paper derives at this conclusion on the basis of theoretical considerations
and the evidence from the Southern Cone countries Argentina and Chile. Section
II shows a small model sufficient to demonstrate the proper functioning of
exchange rate based stabilization, the need to sustain a real devaluation, and the
complementary policy measures necessary for a consistent implementation:
fiscal reform and the liberalization of goods and capital markets.
The experience of Argentina and Chile (Section III) provides an appropriate test
for the theoretical conclusions. The importance of complementary policy
measures and the weakness of the concept in the case of negative shocks is
stressed by the comparison of Argentina and Chile in the 70s and 80s (Section
III.l.). Both countries started with comparable macroeconomic disequilibria at
the beginning of the 70s, implemented an exchange rate based stabilization
program at the turn of the decades, and had to devalue their real exchange rate in
the 80s after the debt crisis broke out. While complementary policy measures
and economic performance were strikingly different, even the good performer,
Chile, could not sustain the fixed exchange rate.
Section ni.2. provides a more detailed analysis of Argentina's present attempt to
stabilize the economy by fixing the exchange rate. The performance during the
Plan de Convertibilidad is highly telling for countries in a situation of acute
crisis. Starting with hyperinflation, stagnation, fiscal imbalances, and a quasi-
closed economy, Argentina implemented a radical shock program: the exchange
rate was fixed against the US $, the monetary base had to be covered by foreign
exchange, the financing of fiscal deficits by the Central Bank was prohibited, the
Peso became fully convertible for current as well as for capital account
transaction, and the US $ could be used as a legal tender. Argentina has
sustained the fixed exchange rate for nearly three years now.
Section IV summarizes the results from theoretical considerations, from the
comparison of Argentina and Chile, and from the analysis for Argentina's
performance during the Plan de Convertibilidad. It also draws policy conclusion
for the other developing economies and newly emerging market economies.II. The Theory
ILL A Model with Traded and Non-Traded Goods
The general implications of exchange rate based stabilization and real exchange
rate adjustment can be shown by means of a simple graphical presentation
[Schweickert, 1993a; 1994b].
1 In Figure 1, the vertical axis measures the real
exchange rate (s) defined as the price of traded relative to the price of non-traded
goods (pt/pn). The horizontal axis measures real absorption (a), i.e. total
domestic demand for domestically produced and imported goods. It is assumed
that the planned level and the structure of domestic supply is constant in the
short run.
The curve T shows all combinations of s and a with external balance, i.e. with
balanced trade if no capital flows are observed.
2 This curve has a positive slope
because, starting at any point on T, an increase in absorption would increase
demand for traded goods. Therefore traded goods have to become more
expensive, i.e. s has to increase, in order to reduce demand for traded goods to
the previous level. With a constant real exchange rate an increase in absorption
would lead to a trade deficit (points to the right of T) and a decrease in
absorption would lead to a trade surplus (points to the left of T).
The curve Y shows all combinations of s and a with internal balance, i.e. with
demand for non-traded goods equal to the supply of these goods. The curve Y
has a negative slope because, starting at any point on Y, an increase in
absorption would increase the demand for non-traded goods and these goods
have to become relatively more expensive in order to maintain internal
equilibrium. Points to the right of Y mark situations of excess demand, points to
the left of Y indicate excess supply.
The adjustment in the case of disequilibrium differs between the two markets. If
the domestic currency is convertible, the prices of traded goods are given by the
For the underlying model, see Dornbusch [1980, pp. 100-103]. The graphical presentation
is adopted from Corden [1991].
The curves are assumed to be straight lines in order to simplify the exposition. The slope
of the indifference curve and the transformation curve is neglected. Under the usual
assumptions this would imply convex curves T and Y. The qualitative results, however,
would be unchanged.Figure 1
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a1world market prices and the nominal exchange rate. With a fixed exchange rate
and exogenous world market prices, the price for traded goods is fixed. Changes
in domestic demand for tradable goods lead to changes in the trade balance
rather than to price adjustment. Total demand for these goods always equals
supply because the difference between domestic supply and domestic demand is
always matched by external demand.
3
By contrast, the prices of non-traded goods are flexible. In the case of a negative
demand shock, they have to decline in order to maintain equilibrium. Otherwise,
demand falls short of supply (a shift of Y to the left towards Y'). This implies
losses in terms of employment and income. Disequilibrium on the market for
non-traded goods reflects the overall internal disequilibrium of the economy
because the supply of traded goods is always demanded.
Due to the different signs of the slopes of curves T and Y, only one combination
of s and a is consistent with internal and external equilibrium. This is shown by
point Gj in Figure 1. At point Gj, overall supply with full employment, a^, is
realized with balanced trade. Moving from Gj along Y to the right implies an
increasing trade deficit.
4 Moving along T to the left implies a decreasing overall
supply.
//. 2. Exchange Rate Based Stabilization
To see how a fixed exchange rate can stabilize an economy, assume that the
economy is in macroeconomic equilibrium and net capital flows are zero (Gi,
Figure 1). The difference between domestic and foreign inflation is compensated
for by nominal devaluation so that the real exchange rate is constant, i.e. the real
exchange rate is in equilibrium but inflation is significantly higher than abroad.
If the exchange rate is fixed in such a situation, inflation decreases immediately
because the price increases for traded goods are curbed by world market
3 A small country faces a perfectly elastic supply of imported goods and a perfectly elastic
demand for exported goods on the world market. This implies that the supply of traded
goods is always demanded at world market prices.
4 The trade balance is given by the difference between the actual absorption along Y and a*.
This difference is smaller than the difference beween the curves T and Y because a
reduced absorption in the case of a trade deficit would reduce demand for both non-traded
and traded goods. Thus the. reduction in absorption needed to close a trade gap is always
larger than the trade gap if demand for non-traded goods is positive.conditions. But ongoing inflation for non-traded goods will lead to an immediate
real appreciation (Gi -> Bi).
Real appreciation creates an excess demand for traded goods and an excess
supply of non-traded goods. This is because traded goods become relatively
cheaper and demand shifts from non-traded to traded goods. Excess demand for
traded goods implies a trade deficit, an outflow of foreign reserves, and - with a
passive monetary policy - a monetary contraction (Bi -> C).
5 As a consequence
absorption decreases, the demand for traded goods declines and the trade
imbalance is reduced. But the decrease in absorption further increases the excess
supply of non-traded goods. This exerts a pressure to reduce the prices of non-
traded goods. Domestic inflation must be even lower than abroad in order to
remove the real overvaluation and the excess supply of non-traded goods caused
by the initial real appreciation (C -» Gi ).
6
A necessary precondition for private agents to adjust prices is that they expect
the monetary contraction to occur. If this is not the case, ongoing inflation,
growing real overvaluation, and increasing internal and external imbalances will
end the stabilization program soon. Therefore, the credibility of the monetary
contraction becomes a basic precondition for the flexibility of prices and for the
success of the exchange rate based stabilization.
7 Problems with its credibility
result from three macroeconomic constraints: the government budget, foreign
exchange reserves, and employment [Schweickert, 1993b].
The need to finance the government budget may constrain the possibility of a
monetary contraction in developing countries because the collection of the
inflation tax and borrowing on thin domestic capital markets play a significant
role in financing government expenditure. Therefore, a monetary contraction
5 In the following, monetary contraction means a decreasing real money supply.
Correspondingly, decreasing domestic prices mean a lower difference between inflation at
home and abroad.
6 In the absence of real shocks, the equilibrium of the real exchange rate remains constant
and the actual real exchange rate has to return to its initial level.
7 Contrary to a stabilization program with flexible exchange rates, the extent of the
monetary contraction is unknown at the beginning of the program. This makes the
credibility of the monetary contraction a challenging precondition in a fixed exchange rate
regime.On the advantages of stabilization with flexible exchange rates, see Schweickert et
al. [1992] and Schweickert [1993a].needs fiscal discipline,
8 i.e. expenditure has to be reduced and/or alternative
taxes have to be raised. Otherwise growing pressure on the central bank to
increase the money supply would be expected by rational private agents. Hence
prices would not be adjusted.
The outflow of foreign exchange reserves could run down the stock of reserves
before trade is balanced. In this case a nominal devaluation will be expected and
this expectation will lead to a devaluation even before the reserves are actually
depleted.
9 Such a devaluation is typically avoided in the short run by increasing
import protection, i.e. tariff and. nonrtariff barriers as well as convertibility
restrictions, in order to achieve a balanced trade without changing the currency
regime [Williamson, 1987]. The expectation of either a nominal devaluation or
increased protectionism significantly diminishes the pressure on private agents
to reduce prices. These problems could be avoided by a full coverage of the
monetary base by foreign exchange. In this case the Central Bank acts as a
currency board and the foreign exchange constraint is eliminated.
If the monetary contraction is possible, the question arises, if it actually occurs.
The fall in demand (Bi —> C) provides strong incentives for the authorities to
change the program and to avoid temporary unemployment via a monetary
expansion (B^ —> D). This means that the announcement of a fixed exchange
rate is time-inconsistent and private agents have an incentive not to adjust prices
but to wait for the policy switch.
1
0
In the case that private agents judge macroeconomic constraints not to. be
relevant, monetary contraction is credible and guarantees a pressure to reduce
the prices of non-traded goods. If these prices are actually adjusted depends on
the price setting behaviour in the real sphere of the economy. The fall of non-
traded goods prices will not occur in the presence of indexation and inflationary
inertia [Edwards, 1993, pp. 5-10] and a low level of competition. In this case,
8 Of course, the collection of the inflation tax could improve because of an increasing
demand for money. This implies that a monetary contraction, i.e. a decrease in real cash
balances, does not occur at all. However, the question addressed here is if a monetary
contraction could be sustained.
9 See the literature on balance-of-payments crises summarized by Aghevli and Montiel
[1991, pp. 229ff.]. .
1
0 See Funke [1993] for an application of time-inconsistency arguments for reform strategies
in developing and Eastern European countries. . . • -the monetary contraction will lead to higher unemployment rather than to a real
exchange rate adjustment.
The adjustment towards a new equilibrium becomes easier if the country is able
to attract capital inflows (T H> T). There are basically three reasons for capital
inflows. First, commercial banks and official lenders honouring the
macroeconomic reform efforts may grant access to new credit lines and increase
foreign direct investment. Second, private agents may shift their portfolio
towards domestic assets if they expect an undistorted macroeconomic
environment and a higher profitability of investment. Third, speculative gains
can be realized in the short-run due to slowly declining nominal interest rates
and the fixed exchange rate resulting in temporarily high real interest rates for
foreign investors.
Large capital inflows finance emerging trade deficits (Bj) and increase foreign
exchange reserves (B^ —> Ej). Hence, the money supply grows and the prices
for non-traded goods do not have to be adjusted downwards. However, such an
equilibrium (Gj) may not be sustainable. First, capital inflows are of a
temporary nature at least to some extent. Second, the country may experience a
negative terms-of-trade shock. Third, if the exchange rate is fixed against a
single currency, e.g. the US $, an appreciation of the US $ against other relevant
currencies would imply a real appreciation for the domestic currency as well.
All these shocks have qualitatively the same implication for the economy. They
shift external equilibrium back towards T. The real exchange rate becomes
overvalued, the trade deficit has to be financed by an outflow of foreign
exchange reserves, and the demand for non-traded goods falls short of supply.
This means that all the problems described above for the case of stabilization
without capital inflows emerge. Moreover, the problems are even more
pronounced due to the initial expansion. Monetary contraction must now be
significantly larger than in the case of exogenous capital flows (G2 —» D). This
is why the reversal of capital flows typically marks the end of fixed exchange
rate regimes. Monetary contraction is not sustained and a devaluation crisis
emerges [Guidotti, Vegh, 1992].
To sum up, two phases of exchange rate based stabilization have to be
distinguished: an expansionary first phase and a second phase where the
economy faces the same problems than in the case of a negative real shock
shifting the equilibrium real exchange rate from s'2 (G2) to sj (G\), i.e. to
devalue the actual real exchange rate. The two basic strategies for real exchangerate devaluation are monetary contraction or nominal devaluation. In terms of a
exchange rate based stabilization program this implies either to stick to the fixed
nominal rate and to allow for reserve outflows or to end the program by a
nominal devaluation. The relative advantages of the two strategies in a situation
of real overvaluation are relevant in two respects. First, it is optimal to end the
fixed exchange rate regime in the case of a strong advantage of a nominal
devaluation. Second, if this is the case, the credibility of monetary contraction
would be rather low and even a modest negative shock could induce a
speculative attack.
//. 3. Real Exchange Rate Adjustment
Differences in efficiency determine the relative advantages of the two strategies
for real devaluation - monetary contraction and nominal devaluation
[Schweickert, 1993b]. The efficiency of a strategy depends on its effectiveness,
its sustainability, its potential costs, and on complementary liberalization
policies. The superiority of one strategy can hardly be assessed on theoretical
arguments. On the one hand, there are disadvantages of the monetary contraction
strategy which have already been discussed: fiscal, foreign exchange, and
employment constraints on monetary contraction as well as a lagged impact oh
relative prices. On the other hand, disadvantages of nominal devaluation and
advantages of monetary contraction over nominal devaluation have to be
considered:
- The inflationary impact of a nominal devaluation reduces the initial real
devaluation effect and hurts the inflation target.
- In the case of a fiscal constraint, the scope for nominal devaluation is limited
because it increases debt service obligations (denominated in foreign
currencies) and decreases revenue from trade taxation (assuming a strong
decline in import values).
- A nominal devaluation may deteriorate the current account and can put
additional strain on the foreign exchange position in the short run due to the
J-curve-effects.
- Contrary to a nominal devaluation a monetary contraction mobilizes domestic
savings, stimulates private investment and raises the efficiency of financial
intermediation by disinflation and higher real interest rates.10
- A monetary contraction also avoids a strong rise in the prices for imported
inputs which could weaken the incentives to raise the production of tradable
goods in countries with strong import dependence.
These arguments suggest that - at least in the cases of a modest overvaluation
and a high inflation rate - it is of advantage to stick to the fixed exchange rate
and to allow for a monetary contraction. The efficiency of both monetary
contraction and nominal devaluation could be improved by complementary
liberalization policies.
1
1 However, the conclusions are different for the
liberalization of goods and capital markets.
The most prominent issues in the liberalization of goods markets are trade
liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises. The arguments
against a simultaneous implementation of trade liberalization and
macroeconomic reform claim that such a policy exceeds the capacity for real
adjustment. There are, however, strong arguments in favour of a simultaneous
implementation [Ize, 19901. First, the production of exports is encouraged by
lower prices for imported inputs shifting trade balance from T towards T"
(Figure 1). This reduces the need for real devaluation and relaxes the foreign
exchange constraint. Second, intensified competition raises the efficiency of
domestic production, allows to reduce prices, and, thus speeds up real
devaluation in the case of a fixed exchange rate (C -» Gi, Figure 1). In the same
vein, the privatization of public-owned enterprises - especially if they belong to
the non-traded goods sector - makes prices more flexible and speeds up real
exchange rate adjustment if an appropriate regulation provides incentives for
competition and enhances efficiency in areas where competition is not possible.
With respect to capital controls, the problem is to measure the temperature of
capital flows [Dornbusch, 1983; McKinnon, 1984]. The flow of cold money, i.e.
long-term capital, is difficult to avoid in the case of capital outflows and is
highly welcome in the case of capital inflows because it reduces the need for
real devaluation. The flow of hot money, i.e. speculative, short-term capital,
could destabilize real exchange rate adjustment. In terms of Figure 1, fluctuating
capital flows imply that external balance fluctuates, e.g., between T and T and
that price signals for adjustment become unreliable. Therefore, exchange
1
1 See Edwards [1989] for an overview over the debate on the sequencing of macroeconomic
reforms and liberalization policies.11




3 It can be
expected that private agents will adjust quicker to changes in relative prices if
they regard them as more stable. The real devaluation policy may become more
effective and sustainable if private agents favour capital controls as a safeguard
against destabilization. Moreover, a higher stability of real exchange rate




Financial market regulations such as fixed nominal interest rates negatively
affect real exchange rate devaluation. A contraction of loanable funds may occur
leading to or expanding a demand surplus (e.g. at point Bi, in Figure 1) if
interest rates are not allowed to rise in order to mobilize private savings and to
relax credit constraints [Corsepius, 1989; McKinnon, 1973, pp. 84 ff.]. This does
not only refer to the monetary contraction strategy but to the nominal
devaluation strategy as well. In this case, real interest rates decline due to the
fixed nominal interest rate and increasing inflation.
1
5 By relaxing credit
constraints, a liberalization of domestic capital markets improves real adjustment
to overvaluation in two respects. First, efficiency enhancing investment in the
production of non-tradables eases the decline of prices for these products. Hence
a real devaluation will be quicker and temporary unemployment could be
avoided. Second, investment in the restructuring of domestic supply in favour of
tradable goods, shifts equilibrium from Gi towards B2 (Y -> Y"; T -» T"). The
larger this supply response, the less the need for real devaluation.
The arguments on the appropriate sequencing of macroeconomic reform and
liberalization policies show that liberalization of goods markets, of the domestic
capital market, and of long-term capital flows can be expected to improve rather
1
2 The effects of speculation can be expected to differ according to the exchange rate regime
adopted. But both fixed and flexible exchange rate systems are vulnerable to destabilizing
speculation.
1
3 It is of course possible to circumvent capital controls by overinvoicing of imports and
underinvoicing of exports. But the controls raise the costs and limit the extent of currency
speculation.
1
4 Generally, overvaluation cannot be avoided or reduced by strict capital controls because it
is due to inconsistent domestic policies and distortions in capital and goods markets in the
first place. However, the relevant question here is whether or not free capital movements
support the real devaluation policy which tries to remove such inconsistencies.
1
5 Contrary to a nominal devaluation, a monetary contraction can improve real interest rates
because of decreasing inflation.12
than to overstrain the capacity for real adjustment. However, as was the case for
the use of monetary and exchange rate policy for macroeconomic reform,
liberalization policies may overstrain the capacity for fiscal adjustment. Trade
liberalization declines trade tax revenues; privatization declines the possibility
for implicit taxation via public enterprises; free capital flows exclude the
collection of the inflation tax via foreign exchange premia; the liberalization of
the domestic capital market increases the cost of borrowing. These effects stress
the need for fiscal reform in order to sustain fiscal control over the economy and
to improve the credibility of the reform program.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the theoretical discussion of
exchange rate based stabilization and real devaluation:
- the preconditions for sustaining an exchange rate base stabilization are rather
demanding: the independence of monetary policy from macroeconomic
constraints - fiscal balance, foreign exchange, unemployment - and a high
flexibility of domestic prices;
- if these preconditions are fulfilled, to stick to the fixed exchange rate in a
situation of an overvalued exchange rate and a high inflation rate has
advantages with respect to the inflation target and economic performance and
disadvantages with respect to the speed of relative price adjustment;
- the liberalization of goods and capital markets - with the exception of short-
term capital flows - helps macroeconomic reform because it improves
adjustment capacity;
- fiscal reform is of utmost importance because fiscal constraints limit both the
use of monetary and exchange rate policy for macroeconomic reform and the
liberalization of goods and capital markets which help maroeconomic reform.
It has to be analyzed in the following if these conclusions fit to the experience
with macroeconmic reforms in the Southern Cone countries Argentina and
Chile.
HI. The Experience
III.l. Argentina and Chile in the 70s and 80s
The experience of Argentina and Chile in the 70s and 80s shows that two
countries starting with comparable conditions and applying comparable
macroeconomic concepts can end with a strikingly different economic13 Bibliothek
des Institute fur Weitwirtschaft
performance [Schweickert, 1993c, Ch. E]. Table 1 shows the four parallel
phases of macroeconomic policy in the two countries. Phase I (PI) was
characterized by socialist governments which left the countries with accelerating
inflation rates and overvalued exchange rates [Fornelli et al., 1987, p. 1;
Fernandez, 1985, p. 871; Corbo, 1985, p. 893]. The first phase of reforms (PIT)
was characterized by numerous devaluations. This fits to the nominal
devaluation strategy for macroeconomic adjustment. At the end of the 70s both











a PI ends with the military coups. PHI














includes only the years in which the fixed
(Argentina) were implemented during the
Source: See text.
countries switched from the nominal devaluation to the monetary contraction
strategy, i.e. to exchange rate based stabilization (PHI). Argentina introduced the
Tablita by which nominal devaluation was reduced progressively. Chile fixed
the nominal exchange rate immediately. At the beginning of the 80s this
exchange rate policy was no longer sustainable and both countries had to switch
to the nominal devaluation strategy again (PIV).
The consequences of macroeconomic policies on inflation, real exchange rate
adjustment, and economic performance (Table 2) were exactly those predicted
by the model in Section II. In both countries, inflation declined during exchange
rate based stabilization in PIII. The real exchange rate appreciated because
inflation was still significantly higher than in the US. Net capital inflows14









































































































































a For the definition of the periods, see Table 1; all values are period <
calculations; effective rates according to a
PI: 1974-75. -
 f PI: 1972-73.
trade weighted
- 8 Own calculations. Real
1972-73. - ' Calculated using actual tax
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nterest rates for bank deposits have been used.
rate. - " PI:
Due to data
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics, Direction of Trade Statistics.,
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, International Financial Statistics. Washington, var. iss.; Banco
Central de Chile, Boleu'n Mensual. Santiago de Chile, var. iss.; World Bank, World Development Report. New
York, var. iss.; Banco Central de Argentina. Information estadistica sobre tasas de interes. Separata del
Boleu'n Estadi'stico. Buenos Aires 1990; Cowitt, Philipp P. (Ed.), World Currency Yearbook. New York, var.
iss.; UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1990. New York 1991.15
increased tremendously even overcompensating the import surge. Due to. the
increase in domestic absorption, average GDP growth rose to 4.3 per cent in
Argentina and 6.7 per cent in Chile. In terms of Figure 1, the economies were, in
the expansionary phase of stabilization approaching a new.equilibrium G2. The
external shock which ended this expansionary first phase was the debt crisis and
the consequent turnaround in the direction of net capital flows. This shift in
external equilibrium meant that the real exchange rate suddenly became crossly
overvalued. Both countries had to give up the fixed exchange rate and to limit a
balance-of-payments crises and a run on the Central Bank. As a consequence of
this crisis, the growth of real GDP deteriorated.
There are, however, significant differences between the two countries. First,
Table 2 shows that Chile implemented the strategies according to the theoretical
concepts shown in Section II: hi PHI the nominal exchange rate was kept
constant while monetary expansion was reduced (the monetary contraction
strategy). In PIV monetary expansion was kept constant while the nominal
exchange rate was devalued (the nominal devaluation strategy). This was not the
case in Argentina. Monetary expansion increased during devaluation periods and
decreased only modestly during the monetary contraction period. As a
consequence, Chile reduced the inflation rate substantially and permanently
whereas Argentina's inflation rate reached record levels in PIV.
Second, exchange rate devaluation in PFV was rule-based in Chile and
discretionary in Argentina. After a short period of floating, Chile implemented a
passive crawling-peg with a band, i.e. the exchange rate was devalued to
compensated for the difference in inflation at home and abroad plus a small
additional devaluation to allow for an inflow of foreign exchange. To the
contrary, exchange rate policy in Argentina was highly discretionary with
permanent changes between fixing and floating. As a consequence, Chile was
able to smooth real exchange rate adjustment and could even improve the
reserve position in PIV while reserves declined substantially in Argentina.
Third, real devaluation in PFV was obviously less contractionary in Chile than in
Argentina. The averages for the growth rate of real GDP shown in Table 2
(Argentina: -0.81 per cent; Chile 1.5 per cent) even underestimate the difference.
While both countries experienced negative growth rates at the beginning of PIV,
the Chilean economy grew at 9.3 per cent in 1989 while the Argentine economy
shrunk at 4.5 per cent.16
These remarkable differences can be explained by the different restrictiveness of
macroeconomic restrictions - above all the fiscal balance - and the different
efforts in liberalizing the economy. With respect to the fiscal balance, Chile
implemented reforms already in PII, i.e before monetary contraction in PHI. A
broad based Value-Added-Tax was introduced [McKinnon, 1982; Meller, 1990,
p. 77f.] which allowed for the substitution of inflation and trade taxation as well
as for an overall elemination of fiscal deficits and domestic credit financing
(Table 2). Fiscal constraints for monetary and exchange rate policy were relaxed
and the policy instruments could be used as implied by theory. Chile was even
able to keep its monetary and exchange rate policy on track after the foreign
interest payments rose dramatically in the 80s. To the contrary, Argentina did
not implement any significant fiscal reform [World Bank, 1990a], relied heavily
on revenues from inflation and trade taxation and domestic credit financing.
Hence, the use of policy instruments was restricted by the need to keep fiscal
balance. As a consequence, monetary contraction in Argentina could not be as
strong and was not sustained as was the case in Chile during Pill and PIV and
nominal devaluation was often delayed in PIV.
Fiscal reforms also allowed for strong liberalization efforts in the case of Chile.
In PI import tariffs, (negative) real interest rates, and foreign exchange premia
show that the trade and capital market regimes were even more restrictive than
in Argentina. This picture changed dramatically during PII and PHI. Chile
reduced average import tariffs and real interest rates became positive whereas in
Argentina average import tariffs increased and real interest rates remained
negative. It was only with respect to capital flows where liberalization was more
farreaching in Argentina than in Chile. While Argentina dismantled foreign
exchange controls completely, Chile always maintained control over short-term
capital flows. As argued in Section II, Chile's emphasis on trade and domestic
capital market liberalization was more appropriate than Argentina's emphasis on
capital account liberalization in order to improve economic performance effects




6 The different attitudes towards trade also reflect the differences in the overall regulation of
goods markets. Most importantly, the privatization policies followed the same lines. It has
to be acknowledged that this was rather a disadvantage for Chile because of the de-facto
unregulated privatization of state-owned banks which allowed conglomerates ('grupos') to
buy their own banks and to built up bad external credits. The debt service for this bad
credits contributed to the net capital outflows in PIV. Hence, privatization increased
overvaluation and the consequent adjustment crisis.17
To sum up, the comparison of Argentina and Chile shows that the same
strategies for stabilization and real exchange rate adjustment can have
completely different results depending on fiscal policy and liberalization
policies. Chile was able to reduce inflation permanently and to adjust the real
exchange rate relatively smoothly because fiscal restrictions to the use of
monetary and exchange rate policy were relaxed already in PII by fiscal reform.
Additionally, Chile was able to put her economy on a stable growth path
because the liberalization of trade and the domestic capital market improved
adjustment incentives and adjustment capacity.
However, Chile's experience shows that even under such favourable conditions
exchange rate based stabilization is hardly sustainable if a huge negative
external shock requires a strong devaluation of the real exchange rate. Possibly
the fixed exchange rate regime in Chile could have been sustained in the case of
a modest or slow deterioration of the external environment. It, therefore,
provides the reference case for Argentina's current attempt to sustain such an
exchange rate regime.
///. 2. Argentina in the 90s
Exchange rate based stabilization in Argentina is far more successful in the 90s
compared to the 80s and it seems to be even more successful than the Chilean
exchange rate based stabilization in the 80s (Table 3).
1
7 Starting with
hyperinflation in 1990, annual consumer price inflation came down to 6.6 per
cent at January 1994. Capital flows changed their direction and Argentina has
received substantial net inflows since 1992. The nominal peso/$ exchange rate
was below the 1:1 parity since April 1991. This means that there was an excess
supply of dollars at this parity which was absorbed by the Central Bank. As
implied by the convertibility law this was directly translated into an increase in
money supply,
1
8 and the monetary base has more than trippled in real terms
since 1990. Market driven expansion led to a real economic growth of about 9
per cent after years of stagnation or decline.
1
7 For a more detailed analysis see Schweickert [1994a; b]. Information was derived from the
sources given in Tables 3 and 4.
1
8 The data on the reserve position of the Central Bank and the monetary base reveals the
high extent to which the monetary base is backed by reserves since 1991. The coverage by
liquid reserves increased from 50.6 % at the end of 1990 to 99.4 % at the beginning of
1993. Starting in 1991 total reserves have always been higher than the monetary base.18
Table 3 — Economic Performance of Argentina Before and During
Stabilization
Consumer Price Inflation
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However, the external balance situation signals that the expansionary first phase
of stabilization may be coming to an end. The net inflow of foreign exchange is
becoming increasingly dependent on capital inflows other than exceptional
financing or foreign direct investment (FDI). This has two consequences. First,
the recent expansion of the foreign exchange reserves is unlikely to be
sustainable. The appreciation of the real exchange rate already turned the trade19
balance into deficit. With ongoing real appreciation, a further increase in the
trade deficit is to be expected. In this context, the recent accumulation of foreign
exchange can not be maintained without a further increase in capital inflows.
Second, the reserve position is becoming riskier. Exceptional financing - mainly
debt rescheduling and the accumulation of interest arrears - used for stabilizing
reserve flows will be eliminated
1
9 due to the Brady deal accepted by Argentina
in 1992 (see below). Additionally, FDI became significantly less important in
1992. The share of the current account deficit financed by FDI was nearly 100
per cent in 1991, but only 55 per cent in" 1992. With an increasing share of the
current account deficit financed by less stable types of capital flows, the reserve
position becomes less stable as well.
The economic performance of Argentina since the implementation of the Plan de
Convertibilidad in April 1991 shows that the predictions of the model are correct
and that Argentina is approaching the end of the expansionary first phase of
stabilization. Even without negative external shocks, reserve inflows are likely
to decrease due to the temporary nature of capital inflows and an increase in the
current account deficit is to be expected due to ongoing real appreciation.
Hence, the completion of fiscal reform and liberalization policies necessary to
avoid or sustain a monetary contraction becomes increasingly important.
The fiscal adjustment which has been achieved can be seen in Table 4. A surplus
in the operational budget of the Treasury was achieved by increasing revenues..
The main sources for the increase in revenue was the improved collection of the
Value-Added-Tax (VAT). The VAT tax base was extended to cover interest
payments and transport activities and the VAT rate was increased from 16 per
cent to 20 per cent. Additionally, tax evasion was reduced significantly by the.





9 As can be seen in Table 1, Argentina would have lost US $ 6 bn of foreign exchange in
1991, if it had not referred to exceptional financing. It is safe to assume that the
convertibility plan would not have been sustainable in such a situation.
2
0 Tax evasion was also reduced due to the reversed Tanzi-effect. With-declining inflation
rates, tax evasion becomes more difficult.20
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Additionally, the radical privatization program led to a strong increase in capital
revenue. The fiscal benefits and risks of privatization can be seen in Table 4.
Although only the direct impact due to cash payments can be identified,
2
1 capital
revenues due to privatization accounted for more than 20 per cent of total fiscal
revenue. The peak in capital revenues was responsible for the total surplus of the
2
1 In 1992 $ 6.7 bn were collected from privatization. Of this total, 2.6 bn were in cash, 1.5
bn in debt transfers, and 2.6 bn in redeemed public debt bonds at market values.21
Treasury at the end of 1991
2
2 and the beginning of 1992. But they dried up at the
beginning of 1993 while the transfers to public enterprises were still
significant,
2
3 and the total deficit returned to high levels. The problem is that
these high deficits now have to be reduced without the possibility of selling
public enterprises to a large extent.
2
4
This is a rather demanding task because financial service payments increased
strongly due to the consolidation of internal and external public debt. The
consolidation of internal debt started in 1991 with the issuance of new bonds -
which contain a grace period - for accumulated credits from pensioners.
2
5 hi
August 1992 a reform was approved by Congress which introduces private
pension funds. At the cost of increasing Treasury transfers starting in 1993,
pensions were raised to the legally required level in order to stop the
accumulation of public debt. Until the complete reform has been implemented
2
2 Total surplus was at 384.8 millions of March 1993 pesos in the fourth quarter of 1991
which is not reported in Table 4.
2
3 A positive long term effect on fiscal balance will result from a reduced stock of public
debt. A further decline in transfer payments to public enterprises can be expected if
privatization is completed because a part of the transfers in Table 4 may be the result of
consolidation activities.
2
4 A problem which is going to be solved is the organization of fiscal federalism and the
consolidation of provincial government budgets. In the past, provincial governments
financed their deficits by credits from the provincial banks which were owned by them.
The provincial banks, in turn, refinanced themselves by rediscounts from the Central Bank
[World Bank, 1990b, pp. 75-79]. If the convertibility plan is to be sustained, fiscal
adjustment also has to take place at the provincial level, i.e. enterprises owned by
provinces have to be privatized and payroll payments to be reduced. The consolidation of
provincial government budgets is impossible without a formalized coparticipation scheme
allowing the provinces to calculate future income. Such a scheme was negotiated in 1993.
2
5 Accumulated credits from pensioners stem from the fact that pensions are financed by the
current contributions of the working population and the fact that these contributions have
not been sufficient to pay the legally required level of pensions (70-82 per cent of the
wage). Some of these special schemes can be labelled political rents and were officially
granted for premature retirement in declining sectors of the economy. Contributions
decreased because of the economic downturn before 1991 and because of strong incentives
to evade this type of tax in a purely distributive system. Legally required benefits
increased because various special pension schemes were created. The deficit of the pension
fund - a quasi-fiscal deficit as the former deficit of the Central Bank - was partly covered
by Treasury transfers. The rest was financed by bonds which were given to the pensioners
instead of cash payments. In 1991 the stock of this type of public debt amounted to $ 7.3
bn with an monthly increase of $ 200 m.22
the overall effect of reducing debt accumulation and delaying debt service on the
one hand and increasing pensions and financing the transition period
2
6 on the
other hand is unknown and the development of the public sector deficit remains
uncertain.
The consolidation of external debt started in April 1992 with the Brady debt
reduction agreement between the commercial banks' advisory committee (BAC)
and Argentina. An interim treatment for 1992 was negotiated and creditor banks
could exchange principal of old debt for either a par bond with a low and fixed
nominal interest or a discount bond with 35 per cent discount but a flexible and
market oriented nominal interest. Most banks opted for the par bond. This
reduces the uncertainty of the development of total expenditure by fixing future
debt service obligations. But at the same time, Argentina accepted high debt
service obligations. Table 4 show that operational surpluses could no longer
cover financial service payments.
Argentina's fiscal adjustment, which is a necessary condition for the
sustainability of a fixed exchange rate regime, has been far-reaching and radical.
This is not only true compared to other developing countries but also with
respect to developed countries. However, the remaining problems to distribute
taxes, to force provincial governments to adjust, to eliminate the quasi-fiscal
deficits of the pension system, and -perhaps most importantly - to transfer the
principal and interest payments accepted in the Brady agreement without
running fiscal deficits contain significant risks and require further adjustment
efforts. Only if private agents expect that the government can solve these
problems without changing the passive monetary policy, the credibility of the
present exchange rate remains high preventing speculative capital outflows. This
will only be the case when fiscal deficits are permanently eliminated.
Fiscal adjustment has to be complemented by liberalization and deregulation
policies because prices have to become flexible downwards in order to allow for
a real devaluation if necessary and because supply response has to be improved
in order to speed up adjustment. Two important measures have been introduced
in Argentina in this respect. First, the currency became fully convertible and
2
6 All employees will have to make contributions to the new funds while the state run system
will continue to cover payments to current retirees and will pay a basic pension to all those
who have paid into the new system for a certain number of years and a compensatory
pension to all members of the old system proportional to the number of years of
contributions and the average wage in the ten years prior to retirement.23
trade has been liberalized substantially linking domestic tradable goods prices
directly to world market prices. Import tariffs have been reduced since January
1991 from an average of 18.15 per cent to an average of 10.24 per cent with a
maximum tariff of 20 per cent for final products and a zero tariff for capital
goods not produced in Argentina. Export taxation and non-tariff barriers have
been abolished. The introduction of a compensation scheme for exporters helps
to equalize the incentives to produce for internal or external markets.
2
7 It can
safely be assumed, that this shift from import substitution to world market
orientation increases competition from abroad helps price flexibility and supply
response.
Second, the radical privatization process aims at improving the efficiency of
production. The list of privatized enterprises is quite impressive. Up to June
1992, the government sold the telephone company, the national airline, TV
channels, petrochemical firms, an electric power station, a steel mill, a shipyard,
hotels, buildings, oil fields, and concessions for roads and railways. In 1993 the
radical privatization program reached its final stage.
2
8 In the end, the gas and
water supply and the transport system will be mainly in the hands of private
entrepreneurs. The privatization includes the so-called public utilities and the
transport system, which are state-owned to a large extent in developing and
developed countries. The important fact is that the public utilities and the
transport system belong to the non-traded goods sector. The higher efficiency
gains resulting from the privatization of firms in the non-traded goods sector, the
higher the probability that theprices of these goods could be reduced, i.e. that
the real exchange rate could be devalued without a nominal devaluation.
2
7 The effects of MERCOSUR are not discussed here. MERCOSUR is a new attempt towards
regional integration which aims at forming a common market for Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. But current trade relations between Argentina and its neighbours
are determined by the real appreciation of the peso and the general trade liberalization in
Argentina rather than by integration efforts.
2
8 The basic privatization strategy was to define supply conditions and price ceilings, to sell
then at the highest price possible, and to keep shares of the privatized firm in the
government portfolio. The case of the telephone company - one of the first public
enterprises sold in 1991 - exemplifies the advantages of this privatization strategy.
Besides the amount for the initial purchase, the government received $ 75 m in tax
payments instead of covering losses as in former years. Additionally the government was
able to sell the remaining shares with the book value being four times the figure paid for
the purchase.24
The picture with respect to the domestic capital market is less clearcut. On the
one hand, nominal interest rates are not regulated and financial data show
increasing deposits, positive real interest rates, and a shift towards longer
maturities.
2
9 Thus, the availability of credit for investment in restructuring
should have improved significantly. On the other hand, state-owned banks
clearly dominate the Argentine banking sector. Privatization would increase
competition, strengthen the incentives to evaluate credit risks properly, and
improve the chances for low-risk, productive investment to claim a higher credit
share. Additionally, the slowdown of the increase in deposits during 1992
underlines the dependence of liquidity and total credit supply on the
development of the reserve position.
3
0 In order to tackle this problem, the
Central Bank allowed the banks in late 1992 to hold their reserves either in
pesos or in dollars and authorized the creation of dollar denominated checking
accounts. In October 1991, the Central Bank had already ruled that it would not
guarantee deposits of more than $ 100 a year per depositor. This means that the
Central Bank will not act as a lender of last resort for the banking system, as was
the case during the banking crisis in 1980. It also means that the substitutability
between pesos and dollars is nearly complete. It is hoped that deposits will be
shifted from peso to dollar deposits rather than being withdrawn from the
financial system in the case of a speculative attack, hi the case of a permanent
outflow of dollars, however, the monetary aggregates will have to contract
substantially.- Therefore, the favourable present credit conditions must be used to
improve the supply of traded goods. Otherwise the reserve position is likely to
deteriorate and Argentina may enter the contractionary phase of an exchange
rate based stabilization.
To sum up, Argentina's chances to sustain exchange rate based stabilization are
considerably better than in the 80s and comparable to those of Chile in the 80s.
This is due to outstanding adjustment efforts with respect to fiscal balance and
the liberalization of goods and capital markets. The most important lesson from
Argentina's recent attempt towards stabilization is that the implementation of a
2
9 At the beginning of the convertibility plan almost 90% of deposits were for periods of 7 -
13 days. By October 1991 the proportion of these short-term deposits had declined to 47%,
and 30 day deposits amounted to 37% of the total. '
3
0 As a first sign of lower liquidity, the initial increase in the stock market index, which was
largely financed by dollar inflows, was reversed during 1992. In November 1992 M2
showed a slight decrease due to currency speculation.25
consistent exchange rate based stabilization program does not require any
sophisticated sequencing if a country is actually willing to stabilize using this
technique. Unfavourable starting conditions have, of course, to be outweighed
by radical fiscal reform and deregulation measures which have to be initiated
simultaneously with the fixing of the exchange rate.
However, the sustainability of exchange rate based stabilization in Argentina has
yet to be tested. The exchange rate could become overvalued, if capital inflows
decline and/or a negative external shock occurs. Due to the extent of the recent
appreciation, the strong dependence on foreign capital, and the complete
openness towards capital flows, real devaluation could become a rather
demanding task.
It depends on two factors whether this is a more or less demanding task for
Argentina than it was for Chile which has to be seen as the reference case and
which had to abandon the fixed exchange rate. On the one hand, the situation is
less riskier because - tough it can not be ruled out - a renewed debt crisis or a
negative shock with a comparable size is not to be expected in the near future.
On the other hand, the situation becomes more riskier the more Argentina
approaches the level of US inflation. In this case, even the need for a modest
real devaluation would require an inflation rate below the US-level or even a
disinflation. Such a situation has never been sustained in practice.
IV. Summary and Policy Conclusions
The theory of exchange rate based stabilization and real exchange rate
adjustment, the comparison of macroeconomic policies in Argentina and Chile
in the 70s and 80s, and the analysis of the Plan de Convertibilidad in Argentina
in the 90s have confirmed the basic hypothesis of this paper. Even if
implementation is perfect the strategy is highly risky due to the concept. Theory
shows that a proper implementation requires demanding efforts in fiscal reform
and liberalization of the economy. Theory also shows that an overvalued
exchange rate is likely to occur and that a real devaluation via a monetary
contraction provides the decisive test for the sustainability of the fixed exchange
rate.
These theoretical considerations explain why Argentina and Chile performed so
differently but could both not sustain exchange rate based stabilization when the
debt crisis broke out. Argentina completely failed to implement the concept26
properly and lost control over the economy during the real devaluation process
in the 80s. Chile implemented the concept properly, could also not sustain the
fixed exchange rate but maintained control over the economy after switching to
a passive crawling-peg regime. Contrary to the former attempt, the current Plan
de Convertibilidad in Argentina, provides an example of a radical fiscal reform
and liberalization of the economy. Because non of these reforms had been
initiated before the fixing of the exchange rate, Argentina had to compete with
time in order to improve the conditions for avoiding or sustaining a real
devaluation. Nearly three years after the start of the program, reforms are in their
final stage and Argentina could possibly sustain a modest negative shock or a
further slowdown of capital inflows.
Three lessons can be offered for other developing and newly emerging market
economies:
- Fiscal reform is of utmost importance. Any macroeconomic reform but
especially exchange rate based stabilization depends on fiscal reform. Fiscal
balance has to become independent of monetary, exchange rate, and
liberalization policies. Only in this case, policy instruments could be used
according to a macroeconomic reform program.
- Credibility could not be imported but has to be established. The argument,
that credibility is imported by a fixed exchange rate is misleading. Credibility
requires fiscal consolidation and a liberalization of goods and capital markets
in order to allow for monetary contraction and real devaluation. Hence,
starting with high fiscal deficits, an unfavourable structure of fiscal revenue
and expenditure, and a high degree of regulation, credibility has to be earned
by internal adjustment in a very short time.
- An exchange rate based stabilization remains a high-risk strategy even in the
case of strong adjustment efforts. Real exchange rate overvaluation can
emerge because of too slow adjustment of domestic inflation, a growing trade
imbalance, negative real shocks, an appreciation of the reference currency,
and lower capital inflows. There are advantages to sustain the fixed exchange
rate and to adjust via a monetary contraction in the case of modest shocks.
However, the chances to sustain large shocks are rather low. The more
inflation converged towards the level of the reference currency, the more
likely large shocks require a deflationary process which is hardly to be
sustained.27
These lessons suggest that exchange rate based stabilization is not an
appropriate strategy for developing and newly emerging market economies.
Especially for the latter group of countries but also for many Latin American and
African economies it is rather unlikely that the ability and the willingness for
fiscal reform and for the liberalization of the economy is strong enough to
follow, e.g., Argentina's Plan de Convertibilidad. Even if this is the case,
developing countries and newly emerging market economies should think long
and hard before making a commitment to a fixed exchange rate. At least in the
medium-run a switch to a more flexible exchange rate is necessary in order to
avoid a deflationary process in the case of an overvalued exchange rate.28
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